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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1977

Dear ·Senator Eastland:
•

Attorney General Griffin Bell recently addressed
himself to the legal effects of the consumer agency
bill. In doing so, he rejected claims that the
legislation raises constitutional questions of
separation of powers or unlawful delegation of
authority.
Specifically, Attorney General Bell concludes that
the consumer agency would not wield unprecedented
power to seek judicial review nor would it be outside the bounds of adequate checks and balances.
Because I believe that his comments will be useful
to you in analyzing this important consumer bill,
a copy is enclosed.
Once again, if you have any questions about the
bill, please do not hesitate to call me at 456-6590.
Sincerely,

Esther Peterson
Special Assistant to the President
for Consumer Affairs

The Honorable James O. Eastland
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Enclosure

@fft~ nf tIF~ -~ttnmrQ ~ rnrrul
WU£fqingtnn, E. (!1. 2nS3U
June 21, 1977

Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff
Chairman
Committee on C-overnmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter is in response to your request for the views of
the Department of Justice on S. 1262, the Consumer Protection
_Act of 1977. The bill would establish in the executive branch
an independent Agency for Consumer Advocacy to be headed by an
Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The central t11rust of the bill is to

authorize,the Administrator to intervene or participate in ongoing federal agency proceedings or activities that may "substantially affect ff an interest of consumers a.nd --to the
extent that any person would by law have the right -- to
initiate or intervene in a federal court action involving the
review -of agency action that, again, may affect an interest of
consumers. At issue is whether reposing this authority in an
executive branch agency creates constitutional problems and
whether an agency with this authority would disrupt or adversely
affect the functions of other governmental agencies or departments.

First, it is argued that the provision allowing the agency
to sue other federal agencies somehow violates the constitutional
requirement o -f a "case or controversy" before the jurisdiction of
a federal court can be invoked. Ho~vever, the fact that a dispute

•

involves two components of the executive branch is not enough in
and of itself to preclude a federal court from exercising jurisdiction. See United States v. Nixoq, 418 u.s. 683, 693 (1974);
Chapman v. Federal Power Commissio~, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
Because the Administrator is to represent the interests of
consumers there will be, in our opinion, sufficient adversarine~s to satisfy the requiremen.ts .of Article III under the holdings
in Nixon and Chapman; put a ~ittle differently, in exercising his
authority u11der the Act the Adrri.nistrator vlould not be engaged in
an "in tr,a - branch" dis~ pu te.
The second constitutionally related question is raised
by charges that the new Agency would not be subject to the
normal checks that govern executive branch operations. The
Administrator is appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The Agency's authority will be
·grounded in an Act passed by Congress and will have been
subjected to standards and restrictions expressly approved by
the legislative branch. This process follows the constitutionally
acceptable manner of creating, selecting and controlling executive
branch agencies and the heads thereof. Mention must also be
made, of course, of the continuing congressional involvement
in the agency's affairs through the appropriation process.

To put the powers and responsibilities of the proposed
agency in perspective one has only to refer to what the Agency
could and coul~ not do under th,e Act. }rlos t importantly , it
would have no regulatory po'\ver. No nevI rules, regulations or
standards of conduct will be promulgated by the Agency. Its
ro l e in the administrative and judicial process is generally
limi ted to participating -- in the same m,a nner, to the same
extent and under the same rules as apply to a private party -in the rulemaking and adjudicatory. actiol1S of other agencies
and the review of those -actions by the courts. The Agency
could not isstie cease and desist or other adjudicatory orders.
Its power to affect the decision making or regulatory process
of other ~ federal agencies is thus limited to an advocacy role
on behalf of consumers. Contrast this role to the vast regulatory powers of other executive branch departments and agencies
and it is apparent that S. 1262 does not raise constitutional
problems of separation of powers or the unlawful delegation of
authority.
-,
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Next, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, 'the proposed
Agency would not unduly disrupt or adversely affect other government departments or agencies. It is nothing new for one agency
to formally intervene in the proceedings of another.
For example,
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice regularly
intervenes in other agency proceedings in furtherance of its
congressional mandate to promote competitiono Suffice to say
that the creation of an agency to assert the consumer perspecliv'e
in agency or court proceedings is not extraordinary or out of
line with governmenta,l initiatives on behalf , of other constituencies
such as labor, businessmen or farmers.
It also seems appropriate to respond to the questions that
have beeQ raised concerning how the consumer interest will be
determined. The bill defines f'consumer" as a user (for personal,
family or household purposes) of goods or services. This is a
common sense definition that establishes a sufficient standard,
in my opinion, to indicate the nature of the proceedings with
which the Agency will be concerned as well as the positions it
will advocate. That the Agency may on occasion be faced with
arguably conflicting "consumer interests'f and be forced to make
what may be difficult choices or refrain from participating at
all is not a troublesome prospect. Other executive branch
agencies mus t make similar decisions an'd determinations on an
almost daily basis.
I appreciate the opportunity to present this Department's
views in support of S. 1262.
,
S'i ncerely yours,
•

•

Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General
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